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WHO PAYS THE PRICE? THE NECESSITY OF TAXPAYER
PARTICIPATION IN CHAPTER 9
C. Scott Pryor*
The recent narrative of Chapter 9 municipal bankruptcies has
focused on the battle between two sets of powerful creditor
interests: municipal retirees and bondholders. Two questions have
dominated this narrative: To what extent can the vested pension
and health care benefits of retirees be modified in bankruptcy?'
How much of a discount can bondholders be forced to take?2 Both
of these constituencies have a claim to be satisfied from a
municipality's future revenues.3 The relative treatment of these
groups of claimants must be evaluated by the requirements that a
plan of adjustment is fair and equitable with respect to dissenting
creditor classes and that the plan is in the best interest of each
creditor.4 Layered on these standards is the requirement that a plan
be feasible.5 The cumulative uncertainty of application of these
tests under Chapter 9 contributes to an environment that
encourages negotiated settlements. 6 A plan, in other words, for
which the competing creditor constituencies will vote.
. Professor of Law, Regent University School of Law. J.D. 1980,
University of Wisconsin Law School. M.A. 1997, Reformed Theological
Seminary. I wish to thank Michelle Wilde Anderson, Craig Stem, Tessa Dysart,
Juliet M. Moringiello, David M. Wagner, and the participants in the Widener
Law Journal Symposium for their valuable insights and suggestions. I also wish
to thank William Magee, Amber Knipe, and Kylen Kafer for their research and
editorial assistance. All conclusions remain mine alone.
1 See Daniel Fisher, Municipal Bankruptcies Set Up War Between
Pensioners and Bondholders, FORBES (Apr. 3, 2013, 9:49AM), http://www.
forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2013/04/03/muni-bankruptcies-set-up-war-
between-pensioners-and-bondholders/ (highlighting the classic tug-of-war
between municipal retirees and bondholders in municipal bankruptcy cases).2Id.
31Id.
4 11 U.S.C. § 943(a)-(b) (2012).
'Id. § 943(b)(7).
6 See Mark N. Berman, New Outlooks on Bankruptcy and Restructuring
Issues, BANKRUPTCY & FINANCIAL RESTRUCTURING LAW 2013, March 2013, at
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There remains, however, a large constituency whose members
are not creditors, but a substantial set of stakeholders who do not
have an opportunity to vote on the plan negotiated among the
claimants. Taxpayers are not creditors; thus, taxpayers do not have
a formal role or representative in a Chapter 9 case. In addition, as
interested parties, but ones without claims, taxpayers cannot vote
on a plan.7 Municipal taxpayers will shoulder the costs of
implementing the plan. Increased taxes and decreased municipal
services are standard fare in recent Chapter 9 cases, but those who
must pay more and receive less have at best only an indirect voice
in the process.
8
Recognizing this problem of unrepresented and non-voting
stakeholders, some bankruptcy courts have recognized that
taxpayers have standing as parties in interest.9 Statutory authority
for taxpayer standing in Chapter 9 is less clear than might be
expected. 10 Even if they are parties in interest, taxpayers cannot
vote on confirmation of a plan, which weakens whatever
bargaining power they have.' 1 These procedural and structural
impediments can be addressed by the bankruptcy courts. The
balance of this paper explains how.
*6, available at 2013 WL 574483 (noting that the current state of the law
encourages negotiated settlements).
/ 11 U.S.C. § 943(a) (allowing only a "special tax payer" to oppose
confirmation of a plan). A "special" tax payer is the owner of property, against
which a special assessment was levied in relation to an improvement benefitting
the property. Id. § 902(3). Throughout this article, the term "taxpayers" refers to
general taxpayers as opposed to such special taxpayers.
8 See, e.g., Carl DeMaio, Fixing California: DeMaio Sees a Money Pit,
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE (Jul. 13, 2013, 6AM), http://www.utsandiego
.com/news/2013/jul/13/fixing-california-more-bucks-less-bang/ (reporting that
California taxpayers are paying higher taxes but receiving less in services).
9 See infra text accompanying notes 142-144.
1o See infra text accompanying notes 128-132.
11 See supra note 7.
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I. FREEDOM FROM (BANKRUPTCY) TAXATION
A. The Limits of Chapter 9
The Tenth Amendment 12 occasions concerns about the limits
of the federal bankruptcy power' 3 with respect to subordinate state
entities like municipalities. 14 Thus, section 904 of the Bankruptcy
Code bars a bankruptcy judge from interfering with the "political
or governmental powers" of a municipality. 15 Included among the
forbidden acts would be an order by a bankruptcy court to a
municipality to increase its tax revenues even if that would
enhance distributions to creditors.16 Although the Bankruptcy
Court cannot order taxes to be increased, the court can refuse to
confirm a plan that does not increase them.' 7 Chapter 9 thus
permits a plan of adjustment to do what the judge may not-
increase taxes.
12 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
13 Compare U.S. CONST., art. 1, §10, cl. 1 (representing one end of the
spectrum by limiting state power to issue bills of credit or coin money without
congressional approval), with Juliet M. Moringiello, Goals and Governance in
Municipal Bankruptcy, 71 WASH & LEE L. REV. 403, 410 (2014) (representing
the limits of federal power "[t]he Tenth Amendment limits the control that a
federal court can exercise over a municipality").
14 The definition of municipality in the Bankruptcy Code is broader than
cities alone. See 11 U.S.C. § 10 1(40) ("The term 'municipality' means political
subdivision or public agency or instrumentality of a State."). For purposes of
this article the terms city and municipality may be used interchangeably.
15 Id. § 904(1).
16 See, e.g., In re Corcoran Hosp. Dist., 233 B.R. 449, 459 (Bankr. E.D.
Cal. 1999) (holding that nothing in Chapter 9 requires a court to raise taxes); see
also Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A
Conceptual Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 476
(1993) (arguing that bankruptcy court imposed tax increases would rightly be
held unconstitutional).
17 McConnell & Picker, supra note 16, at 474-76. But see Kevin A.
Kordana, Tax Increases in Municipal Bankruptcies, 83 VA. L. REV. 1035, 1058-
60, 1065-66 (1997) (highlighting some of the arguments on the other side that
find the judicial authority to increase municipal taxes in the legislative history of
Chapter 9 and the inconsistency of courts to take a plain meaning approach to
interpreting Chapter 9).
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B. The Power of a Confirmed Plan
The power of a plan to increase taxes is not plenary. Section
943(b)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code requires voter approval if
generally applicable state law so mandates.1 8 Conversely, a
confirmed plan alone can increase taxes if state law does not give
taxpayers a voting stake.' 9 In other words, office holders in
municipal government and its creditors can agree to a plan that
increases taxes, and the taxpayers have no vote.20 The public
officials who agree to a tax increase face the risk of losing at the
next election, but subsequent changes in the makeup in municipal
government cannot undo a confirmed plan.2 1 The negative effect
on municipal credit (and credibility) of a subsequent rollback of a
plan's tax increases would be substantial.22
Only a plan that is ultimately confirmed can increase taxes,
and the Bankruptcy Code imposes multiple requirements on
confirmation of a plan of adjustment. Among the three most
significant are that the plan be in the best interests of creditors,23
that it provide for fair and equitable treatment of classes of
creditors,24 and that it not discriminate unfairly among creditors.2 5
18 11 U.S.C. § 943(b) ("The court shall confirm the plan if- (4) the debtor
is not prohibited by law from taking any action necessary to carry out the
plan."); see also Diana Marcum, Stockton Voters Approve New Tax Measure
for Bankruptcy City, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2013, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/nov/O6/local/ la-me-In-stockton-tax-measure-
election-20131106 (illustrating one example where states place some restrictions
on raising taxes).
19 See Richard Briffault, Forward. The Disfavored Constitution: State
Fiscal Limits and State Constitutional Law, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 907, 909 (2003)
("A considerable number [of state constitutions] also limit state and local
taxation."). Briffault goes on to observe, however, that "[s]tate legislatures and
local governments have repeatedly sought to expand the scope of 'public
purpose' and to slip the restraints of the tax and debt limits." Id.
20 See Kordana, supra note 17, at 1042 (showing the ability of creditors and
the municipality to increase taxes without taxpayer approval).
21 11 U.S.C. § 944(a)-(c).
22 See generally Kordana, supra note 17, at 1058 (fully analyzing the
argument of creditors that raising taxes is often the only viable solution for
municipalities).
23 § 943(b)(7).
24 1d. § 1 129(b)(1) (incorporated by § 901(a) of the Bankruptcy Code).
25 Id.
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Whether individually or as classes, the element common to these
standards of confirmation is creditors. What is missing are the
interests of taxpayers. The standards of confirmation directly
address only the interests of creditors, yet taxpayers are certainly
stakeholders in any adjustment of municipal debt. Even though the
Bankruptcy Code does not address them directly, hidden in plain
view is warrant for consideration of taxpayer interests: plans must
also be feasible to be confirmed.26 And feasibility is the key that
unlocks the door to take into account the interests of non-creditor
stakeholders like taxpayers.
II. UNPROTECTED RESIDUAL STAKEHOLDERS
A. Municipal Government Outside Chapter 9
Taxpayers are stakeholders in a municipality along with office
holders, creditors, employees, retirees, and residents. 27  All
stakeholders have some means of participating in municipal
governance whether by contracting with it, working for-or
quitting-it, choosing to own property within its jurisdiction,
monitoring the affairs of its government, or petitioning its office
holders. The role of taxpayers, or at least those who are natural
persons and have the right to vote, is limited to voting for office
holders, monitoring, and petitioning. Taxpayers have on occasion
organized to enhance these powers, but monitoring and petitioning
remain their legally sanctioned powers unless state law provides
28further recourse.
Municipal government exists as an application of the inherent
authority of state power. 29 Municipal governance is generally
26Id. § 943(b)(7).
27 See Christine Sgarlata Chung, Municipal Securities: The Crisis of State
and Local Government Indebtedness, Systemic Cost of Low Default Rates, and
Opportunities for Reform, 34 CARDOZO L. REv. 1455, 1462 (2013)
("[M]unicipal securities issuers must keep investors' risk of loss low even if
risks and costs for taxpayers and other stakeholders ultimately responsible for
repaying municipal bond debt spiral upward.").
28 See id. at 1483-84 (showing the inherently limited powers of taxpayers).
29 Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907) ("Municipal
corporations are political subdivisions of the state, created as convenient
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understood to fulfill three ends or purposes. 30  First, it is the
downstream locus of authority that serves the interests of the larger
state, which is content to delegate local power to local decision-
makers. 31 The sorts of state interests delegated to local government
include those encompassed within the traditional "police
powers"-health, safety, and welfare-as well as the power to tax
and to exercise eminent domain. 32 Second, municipal governance
is the upstream mechanism available to local voters to control local
government decision making. 33 Spending choices reflect most
clearly the upstream concerns of voters.34 Both the downstream
and upstream purposes presuppose that different 3problems are
better resolved at different levels of government. And third,
agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the state as may be
entrusted to them.").
30 The goals or ends to which the powers of municipal governance are put
have expanded over the years from public works to public safety to public
welfare. See JON C. TEAFORD, THE MUNICIPAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICA:
ORIGINS OF MODERN URBAN GOVERNMENT 1650-1825, at 113-14 (1975).
31 OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, JR., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 20 (3d ed.
2009) ("Control over local government [following the American War for
Independence] thus largely passed to the legislative branch, and legislative
control over local government was considered to be unlimited except by specific
constitutional provisions."). The delegated powers, in turn, revolve around three
purposes: public services, maintenance of land for public use, and regulation of
public safety. See TEAFORD, supra note 30, at 114.
32 See REYNOLDS, supra note 31, at 198-99.
3" See id. at 1-2 ("[I]t has always been recognized that many functions can
best be provided at the community level, where the government is not a distant,
dimly perceived entity, but is close to-and is responsive to-its constituents.").
34 See Zoltan L. Hajnal & Jessica Trounstine, Who or What Governs?: The
Effects of Economics, Politics, Institutions, and Needs on Local Spending, 20
AM. POL. RES. 1130, 1137-38 (2010) ("According to this traditional accounting,
local governments can choose to devote their resources to redistributive
spending, developmental spending, or allocational spending.").
35 See Yishai Blank, Federalism, Subsidiarity, and the Role of Local
Governments in an Age of Global Multilevel Governance, 37 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 509, 510 (2010) ("[A] growing number of contemporary problems and
challenges require decision-making and implementation at different territorial
spheres and by different governmental (and political) levels."); see also Nestor
M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in an Era of
State Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 960, 1007-08 (2007) (concluding that local
government serves "as a means of enhancing democratic engagement and civic
participation").
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municipal government meets the baseline requirement for political
legitimacy in the context of American political liberalism-its
office holders are elected.36
Creditors do not figure directly in any of the purposes that
municipalities serve. State-level grants of authority do not require
municipal indebtedness although they authorize it. Citizens rarely
consider municipal debt when voting for office holders.
37
Creditors, at least voluntary ones such as employees, retirees, and
purchasers of municipal bonds, are necessary for a municipality to
carry out its downstream and upstream purposes, but are merely
38
means to the ends of municipal government. Although
ubiquitous, creditors exist outside or below the consciousness of
most municipal stakeholders. 39 Given the limits on the bankruptcy
power imposed by the Tenth Amendment, 40 however, bankruptcy
courts must be careful to ensure balance between the interests of
creditors and other stakeholders.
36 See REYNOLDS, supra note 31, at 2 ("[T]he demand of individuals that
their voices be heard always exerts, at least in any democratic system, a counter-
pressure for smaller units, in which each person's opinion and vote can have
greater impact."); see also Moringiello, supra note 13, at 438 ("Because
municipalities are political instrumentalities, elected officials manage their
functions .... "). For problems associated with municipal elections see infra text
accompanying notes 87-93. For systemic concerns about the dangers of local
autonomy, see Davidson, supra note 35, at 1023-26 (describing the "perils of
local parochialism").
37 See Richard C. Schragger, Citizens Versus Bondholders, 39 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 787, 787 (2012) ("In both these roles-as a bondholder and as a
citizen-my incentive and capacity to monitor local government is limited. It is
not nonexistent, but it is quite crude.").
38 For a thorough analysis of the "ends" of municipal governance, see
Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J. 1118, 1198-
99 (2014).
39 See generally Kordana, supra note 17, at 1046-47 (showing that
municipalities borrow money with the intent to pay it back over time, often
leaving debt to bleed over onto future generations of taxpayers).
40 For example, see "Limitation on jurisdiction and powers of court." 11
U.S.C. § 904 (2004); see generally, David E. Solan, State Bankruptcy: Surviving
A Tenth Amendment Challenge, 42 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 217, 235-37 (2012)
(discussing the evolving tension between state sovereignty under the Tenth
Amendment and federal bankruptcy laws).
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Taxpayers, by contrast, are intimately related to the three ends
of municipal governance.4 1 Without taxpayers, many of whom will
also be residents,42  municipal government need not exist.
Taxpayers are also stakeholders in the functions of municipal
governance. 43 As sources of revenue, they permit municipal
government to carry out its downstream and upstream functions
44
and, given their overlap with residents, taxpayers are vitally
interested in resolution of political issues including municipal
managerial slack.45 Yet, like creditors, taxpayers as such are not
46the objects of municipal governance. Although necessary,
taxpayers only function as political stakeholders in a represented
capacity.
4 7
Taxpayers enjoy mixed protections under state law. Some
state constitutions do not address local taxation. 4 8 Even in states
that subject new or increased taxation to special scrutiny, the rise
of "non-tax taxes" permits local governments to circumvent
constitutional limitations.49 Local governments have added fees,
user charges, and special assessments to real estate taxes to
supplement their revenue.50  Faced with such efforts, state courts
41 See generally Anderson, supra note 38, at 1139 (explaining the
importance of taxpayers to the function of municipal government).
42 See id at 1123 (noting widespread agreement that municipalities should
provide for the health and safety of residents).
43 See id. at 1139 (taxpayers both fund and receive governmental services).
44 See Michelle Wilde Anderson, Dissolving Cities, 121 YALE L.J. 1364,
1437 (April 2012) ("Even if cityhood still exists legally, it is little more than a
geographic label if the government has no money or power.").
45 See infra text accompanying notes 79-89.
46 See Anderson, supra note 38, at 1198 (explaining the broader role and
responsibility of municipal government to consider the health and safety of all
inhabitants).
47 See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 44, at 1395-96 (detailing the effect that
taxpayers' grassroots campaigns can have on local political debates over how to
deal with fiscally distressed localities).
48 See Briffault, supra note 19, at 909 (citing U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N ON
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, SIGNIFICANT FEATURES OF FISCAL
FEDERALISM 18 (1992)) (noting, in 2003, the constitutions of Connecticut,
Georgia, Maine, South Carolina, Vermont, and Wisconsin contained no limits
on local taxation).
49 Briffault, supra note 19, at 932-34.
50Id. at 932.
[Vol. 24
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have acquiesced notwithstanding state constitutional limitations. 51
Thus even outside Chapter 9, taxpayers' interests in local
governance are better advanced by the ordinary political means-
voting, monitoring, and petitioning-than by judicial
enforcement.52
B. Municipal Government Under Chapter 9
Chapter 9 alters much of what justifies municipal government
in the political space outside of bankruptcy. Service as a
downstream functionary of the state remains in place, but control
and even a measure of legitimacy is ceded to creditors. The
addition of creditors as voting stakeholders in Chapter 9 is
warranted by a municipality's insolvency. 53 Nonetheless, local
control and political legitimacy remain--or at least they should
remain-part of the municipal landscape even in Chapter 9.54 The
position of taxpayers as stakeholders also continues near the ends
of municipal governance. The provisions of Chapter 9, however,
elide recognition of taxpayers, which thus attenuates the upstream
function of municipal government and reduces its political
legitimacy.55
The structure of Chapter 9 generally follows the pattern of
reorganization under Chapter 11 with exceptions imposed out of
concern for the Tenth Amendment.56 It is Tenth Amendment
51 Id. at 935 & n.153 (citing numerous examples of state courts that have
upheld more expansive and creative forms of local revenue collection).
52 See supra text and accompanying note 28.
53 See 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(1)-(5) (2006) (requiring proof of insolvency); In
re City of Stockton, 493 B.R. 772, 789-90 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013) (discussing
evidence of city's insolvency).
54 See Moringiello, supra note 13, at 414 ("[O]missions from Chapter 9
reflect the congressional decision to leave the management of an insolvent
municipality to the municipality itself and its state.").
55 See Anderson, supra note 38, at 1197-99 (comparing a creditor-centric
view of providing only those municipal services necessary to making tax
revenues sufficient to pay creditors with a "social justice" view of providing
municipal services adequate to maintain human dignity and flourishing).
56 See Moringiello, supra note 13, at 411 ("Chapter 9 incorporates many
elements of other types of bankruptcy, Chapter 11 in particular."). But see id. at
413 ("The partial incorporation of Chapter 11 concepts reflects the fact that the
2015]
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apprehensions that preserve unimpaired the downstream purposes
of municipal government in Chapter 9.57 Section 903 expressly
provides that Chapter 9 "does not limit or impair the power of a
State to control... the political or governmental powers of [its
municipalities]." 58 Bankruptcy courts have construed the states'
reserved powers broadly.5 From the other direction, nothing in
Chapter 9 formally preempts the upstream powers of monitoring
and petitioning. 60 Practically, however, responsiveness to those
powers is limited by the recognition of creditors as stakeholders.
6 1
Access to and influence on municipal governance is limited, and
thus formal recognition of creditor interests reduces the influence
of taxpayers. 62 Only a finite pool of political power exists, and that
of taxpayers is reduced as the power of creditors is increased.63
Even accounting for the rights reserved to the states, there is
an asymmetrical relationship between the structures of Chapter 9
and Chapter 11. The most significant difference is the scope of
creditor rights protected in the event of cramdown. 64 Cramdown is
the colloquial term applied to the power of the court to confirm a
plan over the dissent of a class of voting parties. 65 Section 901 (a)
of the Bankruptcy Code incorporates two of the three subsections
of section 1129(b)(2) regarding cramdown, those protecting the
bankruptcy court... must refrain from interfering with the governance of a
municipality.").
7 Id. at 424-25.
58 I U.S.C. § 903.
'9 See generally 6 ALAN N. RESNICK & HENRY J. SOMMER, COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY 903.02[l] (16th ed. 2014) (highlighting that Chapter 9
unambiguously states the reserved powers shall remain with the states).
60 That is because "Chapter 9 is better viewed as a component of a state
plan to resolve the financial distress of its municipalities than an independent
alternative to state intervention." Moringiello, supra note 13, at 416.
61 See id at 411-12 (delineating a municipality's options under Chapter 9
and the statutory controls that creditors have over the process).
62 Id.
63 See id (indicating that municipalities do not have "unfettered control"
over reorganization plans, but are largely constrained to considering the interest
of creditors).
64 Id.
65 Id. ("Like Chapter 11, Chapter 9 contains a cramdown provision, which
provides that the plan can be imposed on nonconsenting creditors if at least one
class of creditors accepts the plan . . ").
[Vol. 24
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rights of secured and unsecured creditors. 66 To confirm a plan of
adjustment over the dissent of a non-consenting class of creditors,
the plan must satisfy two cramdown-specific criteria: it must not
"discriminate unfairly" and it must be "fair and equitable."
67
Section 129(b)(2)(A) specifies further cramdown protection for
secured creditors and section 1129(b)(2)(B) for unsecured
creditors.6
8
Chapter 1 l's protections for holders of equity interests
(shareholders of the corporate world) in the event of cramdown are
not incorporated by Chapter 9.69 Such an omission makes sense in
one respect; after all, neither residents nor taxpayers "own" the
residual value of a city because there can be no residual value-a
city cannot be liquidated, only dissolved.70 The assets of a
dissolved city are transferred to the succeeding unit of local
government. Thus, in the event of its dissolution, municipal
assets do not devolve to its residents.72 In another respect,
municipal taxpayers are disadvantaged in comparison to corporate
shareholders.7 A shareholder's loss is capped at the amount paid
for the equity interest.74 A taxpayer, by contrast, is exposed to a
future of compulsory contributions to the ongoing municipal
enterprise.75
Notwithstanding taxpayers' lack of a legal interest in the
municipal entity as such, the nature of their relationship is more
66 11 U.S.C. § 901(a); see also id § 1129(b)(2)(A)-(B).
67 Id. § 1129(b)(1) (incorporated by 11 U.S.C. § 901(a)). For a through
analysis of Stockton's eligibility for Chapter 9 relief, see generally C. Scott
Pryor, Municipal Bankruptcy: When Doing Less Is Doing Best, 88 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 85, 96-97 (2014).
68 See 11 U.S.C § 1129(b)(2)(A)-(B).
69 Id. § 1 129(b)(2)(C); id. § 901(a) (showing that section 1 129(b)(2)(C) is
not incorporated by Chapter 9).
70 See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
71 Anderson, supra note 44, at 1368.
72 See Moringiello, supra note 13, at 441-42.
73 Id. at 438 ("[A municipality] does not have shareholders, who bear the
risk of its failure.").74 id.
75 See Anderson, supra note 44, at 1384 (explaining the goal of
municipalities to remain in the same form before and after bankruptcy even
though taxes may be high and public services diminished).
2015]
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closely intertwined with the financial health of a city than that of
most shareholders in a corporation. Corporate creditors do not
have the power to compel shareholders to contribute to a
reorganized enterprise, but municipal creditors effectively have
76such power through a plan of adjustment. Liquidation by plan or
through Chapter 7 ends the economic life of an insolvent
corporation. 77 Insolvent cities, on the other hand, continue zombie-
like to limp along. 78 The citizens must continue to pay taxes, yet
remain exposed to ongoing "service insolvency" from their
municipal government.
79
When elected municipal officials negotiate with creditors, one
could hope such officials would protect the interests of their
constituents, those whose votes put them in office or might remove
them at the next election. Yet, the lack of interest in municipal
elections makes them a poor means by which to protect the
interests of taxpayers. 80 Outside Chapter 9, the opacity of the
76 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
77 Moringiello, supra note 13, at 433.
78 See Christine Sgarlata Chung, Zombieland / The Detroit Bankruptcy:
Why Debts Associated With Pensions, Benefits, and Municipal Securities Never
Die ... And How They Are Killing Cities Like Detroit, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
771, 781-82 (2014) (detailing the horrific degradation of Detroit's infrastructure,
public services, population and public coffers as the city faces rising crime,
poverty, and blight).
79 Cases utilizing the concept of "service insolvency" or "service delivery
insolvency" when considering a municipality's eligibility for Chapter 9 relief
include, In re City of Stockton, 493 B.R. 772, 788-90 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013),
and In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 169-70 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013). As
Michelle Wilde Anderson explains, however, there is no straightforward
standard by which to measure the extent of municipal services residents are
entitled to expect. See Anderson, supra note 38, at 1194 ("I find it surprising to
report that neither Chapter 9 case law nor state law regulations or guidelines
define legally adequate service levels .... ").
80 See ZOLTAN L. HAJNAL, AMERICA'S UNEVEN DEMOCRACY: RACE,
TURNOUT, AND REPRESENTATION IN CITY POLITICS 24-25 (1968):
This low turnout means that the skew in turnout at the
subnational level can be dramatic. Tingsten's (1937) "law of
dispersion" tells us that the possible extent of a skew grows as
turnout declines. If... only a small fraction of the population
participates, the skew can be severe. For this reason, we
might be especially concerned about the representativeness of
democracy at the local level.
[Vol. 24
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workings of municipal government and the ability of special
interests to lobby local office holders attenuates the power of
taxpayers. 81 Once in Chapter 9, the organized presence of creditors
and after-the-fact involvement of voting taxpayers reduces their
influence in municipal government generally and, hence, in the
process of negotiating a Chapter 9 plan.
82
C. Implications of Non-Liquidation
The ongoing nature of municipal existence provides the
conceptual reason for excluding taxpayers from the formal
negotiating table and voting on a plan. Congressional thinking
along these lines concluded that the interests of taxpayers are not
"impaired" so long as the municipality provides baseline
services. 83 Unlike shareholder interests that cease with the
liquidation of an insolvent corporation, taxpayers retain their status
as stakeholders even after confirmation of the Chapter 9 plan.
84
They retain the power to vote out of office those who agreed to
enter Chapter 9, but the confirmed plan controls. 85 Lack of explicit
attention to municipal taxpayers in bankruptcy law was also due to
Tenth Amendment concerns. 86 If state law does not directly afford
taxpayers the power to vote on tax increases, how can Congress do
so indirectly by giving taxpayers a vote on plan confirmation?
81 See Briffault, supra note 19, at 945 ("Special interest groups have the
incentive to lobby and the means to reward legislators who provide them with
benefits. But the general public is unlikely to be sharply affected by any one
interest group giveaway and lacks both the incentive and the means to closely
police spending programs.").
82 See Moringiello, supra note 13, at 411 (explaining that a municipality's
creditors initially vote on a plan).
83 See Anderson, supra note 38, at 1196-1204 (describing a multi-faceted
list of factors that should be used to analyze the baseline of services provided by
a municipality).
84 See generally McConnell & Picker, supra note 17, at 465 (explaining
that unlike corporations, "municipalities are not liquidated in bankruptcy").
85 See, e.g., Chapter 9 Plan of Adjustment for Jefferson County at 63, In re
Jefferson Cnty., Ala. (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Nov. 6, 2013), ECF No. 2182, available
at www.alnb.uscourts.gov/jca?page=74 (limiting power of Chapter 9 debtor to
raise sewer rates after confirmation); see also Moringiello, supra note 13, at 408
(discussing how and why Congress passed the predecessor to Chapter 9).
86 See Moringiello, supra note 13, at 445-46.
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Congress additionally may have believed that other aspects of the
political process-voting, monitoring, and petitioning-provided
taxpayers with adequate protection of their interests.
III. WHEN THE RIGHT TO VOTE ISN'T ENOUGH
A. Attenuated Municipal Politics
Municipal elections enjoy less legitimacy than elections at
other levels of state and federal governments. Low voter turnout
87
and the opacity of the issues of municipal governance, especially
municipal finance, 88 cause most municipal elections to turn on the
ability of relatively small groups to organize a high-percentage
turnout of like-minded voters.89 Thus the personal interests of
municipal office holders may not coincide with larger groups
within the municipality, such as taxpayers. 90 "Capture" by a
segment of an electorate is a well-recognized problem.9' Capture
need not rise to the level of corruption to raise concerns because
simple divergence of interests between elected officials and
taxpayers may result in a failure to identify important issues and
respond to them.92 Corporate law scholars have labeled such
divergence "managerial slack" and have spent considerable effort
87 HAJNAL, supra note 80, at 24.
88 See Schragger, supra note 37, at 794.
89 See Pryor, supra note 67, at 100 ("[T]he weakness of electoral discipline
for municipal government offices exacerbates the costs of political
agency .... "); Hajnal & Trounstine, supra note 34, at 1125 ("Although
presidential and Congressional elections get much of our attention, urban
politics represents a key component of American democracy. Policy decisions at
the local level affect citizens in profound and immediate ways.").
90 See Pryor, supra note 67, at 107 (pointing out that taxpayers and
unsecured creditors such as municipal retirees face uniquely heightened risks
concerning municipal insolvency).
91 See Robin Paul Malloy, The Political Economy of Co-Financing
America's Urban Renaissance, 40 VAND. L. REV. 67, 102 (1987) (discussing
financing in so-called public private partnerships that redirects wealth between
and within cities).
92 See George G. Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The Role of Debt in
Interactive Corporate Governance, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1073, 1074 (1995)
(arguing that failure to react to exogenous shocks is a more important cause of
business failure than the shocks themselves).
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to address its reduction. 93 Public choice theory explains this
problem at the local level in terms of two insights.94 First, elected
officials are tempted to make decisions "that advance their own
personal welfare, even when doing so comes at the expense of the
community's general welfare." 95 Second, as observed above, the
scale of municipal politics makes them particularly susceptible to
minorities with strong organizational or financial resources.
96
Municipal managerial slack ranges from run-of-the-mill
incompetence through lack of effort from political entrenchment
all the way to outright corruption. 97 All municipal stakeholders are
concerned about slack because it impedes a municipality's efforts
to carry out its downstream and upstream duties and impairs its
political legitimacy. 98 Scholars focusing on corporate governance
have identified internal and external mechanisms to deter and
correct managerial slack.99 For a corporation, the internal control
mechanisms include shareholder voting, shareholder proposals,
and legally enforceable fiduciary duties.'00 Voting out sitting
directors, passing shareholder resolutions, and successfully suing
directors for breach of duty are potent responses to managerial
93 1d. at 1074-81.
94 Clayton P. Gillette, In Partial Praise of Dillon's Rule, Or, Can Public
Choice Theory Justify Local Government Law?, CHI.-KENT. L. REv. 959, 961
(1991).
95 -d.
96 See supra text accompanying notes 87-89; see also Gillette, supra note
94, at 961-62 ("[L]ocalities are particularly susceptible to the political alliances
that form as a result of economic interests, as local governance heightens both
opportunities for the formation of some groups and opportunities for free riding
among those not easily organized.").
97 See Anderson, supra note 38, at 1149 ("Beyond poor planning and
unrealistic performance models for pension liabilities, the research cities have
faced other management problems. These include failure to plan for downturns,
staffing challenges, and, in a few cases, self-dealing and corruption."); see also
Triantis & Daniels, supra note 92, at 1074 (describing managerial slack in terms
of "lapses in managerial competence or effort, managerial entrenchment or
empire building, and excessive managerial compensation or perquisite
consumption.").
98 See supra note 55 and accompanying text (discussing how Chapter 9
reduces the upstream function of municipal government).
99 Triantis & Daniels, supra note 92, at 1076.
'
00 Id. at 1075.
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slack that exist for owners of a corporate firm. 10' Forces external
to a firm that address slack in corporate governance include its
lenders and the market.10 2 Lenders who will no longer lend and
buyers who no longer buy indicate that something about the
governance of a firm is not in order.'0 3 Lender and market actions
are thus signals to shareholders, whose residual interests are at risk,
to take action.'
0 4
The relative significance of internal and external means to
rectify managerial slack in municipal government is nearly
reversed. Municipal lenders are often diffuse groups of
bondholders whose individual claims are insufficient to warrant
monitoring municipal government. 0 5 In addition, when managerial
slack comes to the attention of individual bondholders, exercising
their exit rights is easy; bondholders can simply sell.
Unfortunately, the opacity of the market for municipal financial
debt reduces the signaling function of sales of bonds in the
secondary market. 1°6 In other words, municipal managerial slack
is only weakly affected by individual creditor action. 107
Even indenture trustees who underwrite issuance of municipal
bond debt have not taken an active role in monitoring for slack.
The long-standing pattern of paying bonds in full has lulled
trustees into a low level of diligence. 1° 8 Moreover, requiring
101 Id.
°21d. at 1075-76.
l°3Id at 1091.
' See id at 1092 (indicating that investors can rely on bank monitoring to
inform their decisions).
105 See Schragger, supra note 37, at 787 ("[Even] as a
bondholder... [one's] incentive and capacity to monitor local government is
limited. It is not nonexistent, but it is quite crude.").
106 See U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N, STAFF REPORT ON THE MUNICIPAL
SECURITIES MARKET at 105, (July 31, 2012), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/munireport073112.pdf ("[M]arket
participants have stated that access to current financial information about issuers
or obligated persons may be limited, difficult to find, or unavailable.").
107 But cf Triantis & Daniels, supra note 92, at 1079 ("[T]hrough their
observable reactions, [corporate] stakeholders convey signals and information
regarding the corporation to each other.") (emphasis added).
108 See Pryor, supra note 67, at 98 ("The near-perfect record of payment of
municipal securities has provided the historical cocoon that encouraged
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municipal issuers to purchase bond insurance exacerbates trustee
indifference.109 The active secondary market in municipal
securities also reduces concerns of indenture trustees. 110 There is
no market for municipal services comparable to that for business
entities. 11' Thus the effectiveness of the external means-lenders
and the market-to identify managerial slack is negligible in the
case of a municipality.
There is little space for taxpayer protection or even input in
states that do not provide for special elections for approval of
additional debt or taxes." 2 Indeed, even in states whose
constitutions limit local taxation and indebtedness, judicial
responses have worked to weaken those limits. 1 3 In the event of
municipal insolvency, it is taxpayers among all stakeholders who
are better positioned to identify managerial slack in municipal
government. What before a financial crisis may have been of little
concern114 becomes much more salient upon filing of a Chapter 9
bankruptcy. When awakened to the risks of municipal
mismanagement, taxpayers will have a strong incentive to examine
municipal management because, unlike creditors, they cannot
reallocate their risk by selling their debt in an opaque secondary
market. Nor can taxpayers do much to address risk before it
materializes. Unlike creditors, who can reduce risk by improving
investors to be lackadaisical about the fiscal and financial fundamentals of
municipal debt issuers.").
109 Bond insurance shifts the risk of default onto insurers, and thus, has the
tendency to enhance a municipality's creditworthiness. Id. at 91.
Ito See id. at 98 ("[T]he secondary market in municipal securities is active,
[but] matching small transactions is not straightforward and current pricing
information is often lacking.").
"' There are no buyouts or takeovers of failing municipalities, nor
competitive product markets for municipal services; either a municipality
provides a service or it does not. But cf Triantis & Daniels, supra note 92, at
1075-76 (naming competitive product markets, leveraged buyouts, and corporate
takeovers as some of the external controls over corporate governance).
112 California has the most well-known requirement for taxpayer approval
of tax increases, Proposition 13. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, §§ 1(a), 2(b). For
description of widely used techniques to avoid state constitutional limits on
increasing taxes see supra text accompanying notes 48-51.
113 See Briffault, supra note 19, at 957 ("[F]iscal limits [often receive]
disfavored treatment by many state courts ....
114 See supra note 105.
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the quality, liquidity, and diversification of their assets, taxpayers
are tied to the municipality where their 
property is located."ae
B. Right to Vote in Bankruptcy
Equity security holders 1 6 have the right to vote on a corporate
plan of reorganization unless they are totally impaired.1 17  It
follows that a class of equity interests is conclusively presumed to
have rejected the plan if it proposes to cancel those interests. In
that event, the plan must be crammed down to be confirmed."
18
Cancellation of equity interests, however, requires proof of
insolvency, which in turn justifies shareholder standing on that
issue. 19  Due process requires that shareholders have an
opportunity to be heard before their equity interests are
eliminated. 20 Shareholders are thus parties in interest through the
point at which the court determines they are "out of the money."'21
Taxpayers are not equity security holders. 22  It is thus no
surprise that the sections of Chapter 11 addressing equity security
holders are not incorporated in Chapter 9.123 Similarly, Chapter
I l's provisions for cramdown of equity interests are excluded from
115 See Pryor, supra note 67, at 105 ("Modem portfolio theory explains that
risk can be reduced by improving the quality, liquidity, and diversification of
assets.").
116 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(16), (17) (2006).
117 Id. § 1126(g).
118 Id. § 1 129(b)(2)(C). Cramdown of equity interests in Chapter 11 is
rarely difficult in light of the insolvency of most corporate debtors together with
application of the absolute priority rule. Id. § 129(b)(2)(B)(ii).
119 See generally Lawrence Ponoroff, Enlarging the Bargaining Table:
Some Implications of the Corporate Stakeholder Model for Federal Bankruptcy
Proceedings, 23 CAP. U. L. REv. 441, 475 (1994) (discussing the reasoning for
requiring proof of insolvency).
120 See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1129.05[3] (16th ed. 2014) ("If a
plan eliminates any class, that class is deemed conclusively to have rejected the
plan. Members of that class are then entitled to a showing that the plan is fair
and equitable as to them. .. ").
121 Id. ("[I]f equity is to be eliminated, as will be the initial consideration
with most insolvent debtors, then equity holders can force a valuation of the
reorganized debtor .... ").
122 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(16), (17) (2006).
123 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (2012).
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Chapter 9.124 Taxpayers cannot vote on their municipality's plan
because their political interests in municipal governance are not
cancelled. 125 Moreover, unlike holders of equity interests, 126 the
Bankruptcy Code does not explicitly afford taxpayers standing as
parties in interest before plan confirmation.' 27 Taxpayers, without
the right to vote or standing to object, are thus marginalized in
Chapter 9.
IV. A CODE-BASED SOLUTION
A. Taxpayer Standing
Even if they are not among a municipality's creditors, some
courts have considered taxpayers as parties in interest.1 28 Other
courts have concluded that taxpayers have not been threatened
with a concrete injury sufficient to qualify as parties in interest.129
The description in Chapter 11 of parties in interest, which is
incorporated into Chapter 9,130 does not expressly include
taxpayers.13 1 That omission alone is not conclusive because the
rules of construction in section 102 of the Bankruptcy Code
provide that a list which "includes" a series is not limited to the
items listed.
1 32
124 id.
121 Id. §§ 903-04 (preserving state and local governmental political power
and control over property and local fiscal matters).
126 See, e.g., id. § 903 (binding only creditors who consent to the plan); id.
§ 943 (requiring the plan to be in the best interest of creditors).
127 Id. § 901(a) (mentioning nothing of taxpayer standing); see also id.
§ 901 et seq. (lacking any mention of taxpayer standing); id § 943 (describing
confirmation without mention of taxpayer input).
128 In re Mount Carbon Metro. Dist., No. 97-20215MSK, 1999 WL
34995477, at *4 (Bankr. D. Colo. July 20, 1999).
129In re Barnwell Cnty. Hosp., 459 B.R. 903, 908 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2011).
130 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 901(a), 1102(a)(3), (4) (2012) (showing inclusion of
parties of interest in Chapter 9).
131 Id. § 1109(b) ("A party in interest, includ[es] the debtor, the trustee, a
creditors' committee, an equity security holders' committee, a creditor, an equity
security holder, or any indenture trustee .... ).
132 Id. § 102 ("In this title ... 'includes' and 'including' are not limiting[.]");
see also Vermejo Park Corp. v. Kaiser Coal Corp. (In re Kaiser Steel Corp.),
998 F.2d 783, 788 (10th Cir. 1993) ("Under the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.
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What have the courts said to the issue of taxpayers as parties
in interest? Seven decades ago the Fifth Circuit denied a petition
of taxpayers to intervene in a Chapter IX composition. 33 The City
of Stuart proposed a plan to refinance some of its bond debt, and
several taxpayers wanted a declaration that their property, which
had not been subject to taxation for the original bonds, should
remain free from taxes to pay the new bonds.1 34 The court held
that the Bankruptcy Act did not permit courts to consider matters
such as local taxes that were controlled by state law.' 35  The
opinion was not explicitly based on Tenth Amendment concerns
but only on the court's conclusion that "[C]ongress has not
undertaken to confer jurisdiction to determine them."'136 The Fifth
Circuit's holding was particularly straightforward, since the bonds
to be issued under the city's plan would reduce current municipal
payment obligations and the plan said nothing about taxes.137 The
normal means of access to municipal governance-voting,
monitoring, and petitioning-could protect the taxpayers'
interests.1
38
Whatever was the scope of standing to be heard under Chapter
IX, it has been expanded by the Bankruptcy Code. 139 Section 206
of the Bankruptcy Act limited standing to the debtor, indenture
trustees, creditors, and stockholders, 140 but section 1109(b) of the
Bankruptcy Code has added trustees and committees to the list.
14
'
§ 102(3), the word 'including' is not a limiting term, and therefore, 'party in
interest' is not confined to the list of examples provided in section 1109(b).").
133 Green v. City of Stuart, 135 F.2d 33, 35 (5th Cir. 1943).
134 id.
135 Id. ("Nothing in the act purports to confer jurisdiction upon the court of
bankruptcy to determine ... particular persons and properties subject to its
taxing powers.").
136 Id.
137 id.
138 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
139 See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1109.LH (16th ed. 2014) ("The
history of section 1109 consists of two interrelated developments. The second
involves the expansion of the right of the myriad 'parties in interest' affected by
any particular business failure to participate in the process of the business'
reorganization.").
140 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, § 206 (1898) (amended
1976).
141 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) (2012).
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Thus, a bankruptcy court in Colorado recognized the standing of
taxpayers to "raise ... appear and be heard" in a Chapter 9 case, at
least when it came to confirmation issues.142 The court went on to
conclude that where the plan "implicitly depends upon [debtor]
property owners paying for all" substantial improvements, the
taxpayers "have sufficient stake in the Chapter 9 proceeding to
object to confirmation." 143 Similarly, in another Colorado case, a
property owner who did not currently pay taxes had standing to
object to a plan that would revoke his tax exemption. 44
Other courts have been less inclined to recognize taxpayers as
parties in interest. Two decades ago, Bankruptcy Judge Steven
Rhodes denied a request of taxpayers to intervene in a Chapter 9
proceeding of a multi-county municipal hospital authority. 145 The
taxpayers had sought to object to the hospital's Chapter 9 plan
because they believed it was inconsistent with state law, but not
because the plan was not feasible. 146 Judge Rhodes held that the
taxpayers were not parties in interest.
47
A bankruptcy court in South Carolina reached the same result
when faced with a motion to intervene by a self-described group of
interested citizens who were concerned that a hospital that served
two counties might be relocated. 148 The citizens' committee
objected to the hospital's eligibility for Chapter 9 relief, not the
142 In re Mount Carbon Metro. Dist., No. 97-20215 MSK, 1999 WL
34995477, at *3 (Bankr. D. Colo. July 20, 1999).
143 Id. at *4.
' " In re Wolf Creek Valley Metro. Dist., 138 B.R. 610, 613, 616, 620
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1992).
145 In re Addison Cmty. Hosp. Auth., 175 B.R. 646, 647 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. 1994).
146 Id. at 648 ("Concerned Citizens alleges that the chapter 9 plan submitted
by Addison does not comply with the intended purpose of the hospital as
provided in both the [Joint Hospital Authority] Act and the by-laws.").
147 Id. at 650 (quoting In re City of Bridgeport, 128 B.R. 30, 31 (Bankr. D.
Conn 1991)) ("Where a party is merely interested in the outcome of the matter
and does not have a direct legal interest in the chapter 9 proceeding, that party is
not a 'party in interest.' "). The court went on to express concern that permitting
taxpayers without a particularized concern to participate "would hamper, and
unduly delay, the debt adjustment process." Id.
148 In re Barnwell Cnty. Hosp., 459 B.R. 903, 905, 909, 911 (Bankr. D.S.C.
2011).
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feasibility of its plan. 149 The court pointed to section 904 of the
Bankruptcy Code, which prohibits the court from interfering with
"any of the political or governmental powers of the debtor,"' 50 and
concluded that the citizens were not parties in interest because the
harm they described was "hypothetical, contingent, and
speculative." 151 The normal political process was the forum for
questions of governance. 52  The limitations of standing under
Article III of the Constitution, 53 as well as the boundary
established by the Tenth Amendment, formed the basis for the
court's conclusion.
154
"Determining whether a given party is a 'party in interest' is a
recurring problem," observed a bankruptcy court in Illinois.
55
Given the vagueness of the expression, it is no surprise that courts
have concluded that the range of parties in interest must be
determined "on a case by case basis."' 56 The Third Circuit's
standard for standing in bankruptcy is "whether the prospective
party in interest has a sufficient stake in the proceeding so as to
require representation."' 157 Such a standard merely restates the
issue. The Supreme Court's decisions on Article III standing-
beginning with Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife158-add only
slightly more substance when applied in a Chapter 9 context.'5
9
149 Id. at 906.
150 Id. at 910 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 904(1) (2006)). Taxation is a core power
of government. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 67 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) ("A judicial taxation order is but an attempt to exercise a power that
always has been thought legislative in nature.").
151 In re Barnwell, 459 B.R. at 909. The court also expressed concern about
efficiency: "Allowing all citizens to be heard in Debtor's eligibility proceeding
would not be productive for anyone involved, but would merely cause confusion
and delay." Id.
152 Id. at 911.
153 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 ("The judicial Power shall extend to
all Cases, in Law and Equity. .. ").
154 In re Barnwell, 459 B.R. at 906, 910.
155 Peachtree Lane Assocs. Ltd. v. Granader (In re Peachtree Lane Assocs.,
Ltd.), 188 B.R. 815, 824 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
156 In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d 1034, 1042 (3d Cir. 1985).
157 Id.
158 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
159 The Court in Lujan addressed the standing of environmental groups
attacking the failure of the Secretary of the Interior to apply the Endangered
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The focus of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence of standing has
revolved around individual or organizational challenges to
regulatory (in)action rather than participation in a collective
proceeding like bankruptcy.' 60 If confirmation of a Chapter 9 plan
Species Act to actions of federal agencies in other nations. Lujan, 504 U.S. at
558-59. In an opinion written by Justice Scalia, the majority concluded the
organizations did not have standing and described three criteria by which to
evaluate standing:
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact"-an
invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete
and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural
or hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal connection
between the injury and the conduct complained of.... Third,
it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the
injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.
Id. at 560-61 (internal quotation marks omitted). Fourteen years later the
Court relaxed the requirements for standing where Congress has afforded an
individual a distinct "procedural right" to protect a "concrete interest."
Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 517 (2007) (citation
omitted) ("When a litigant is vested with a procedural right, that litigant has
standing if there is some possibility that the requested relief will prompt the
injury-causing party to reconsider the decision that allegedly harmed the
litigant."). Only three years elapsed before the Court, through Justice Scalia,
trimmed the scope of standing in such procedural rights cases by re-emphasizing
the need for a concrete injury. See Summers v. Earth Island Institute, in which
Justice Scalia declared:
But deprivation of a procedural right without some concrete
interest that is affected by the deprivation-a procedural
right in vacuo-is insufficient to create Article III standing.
Only a "person who has been accorded a procedural right to
protect his concrete interests can assert that right without
meeting all the normal standards for redressability and
immediacy."
Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 496 (2009) (citation omitted).
160 See, e.g., In re Barnwell Cnty. Hosp., 459 B.R. 903, 908-09, 911
(Bankr. D.S.C. 2011) (finding that the Committee failed to present evidence
"showing that any of the members of the Committee [had] a pecuniary interest
in [the] bankruptcy proceeding"); In re Addison Cmty. Hosp. Auth., 175 B.R.
646, 650 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1994) (citation omitted) (explaining that "[w]here a
party is merely interested in the outcome of the matter and does not have a direct
legal interest in the chapter 9 proceeding, that party is not a 'party in interest.' ");
Green v. City of Stuart, 135 F.2d 33, 34-35 (5th Cir. 1943) (discussing what
constitutes a proper party in a proceeding for composition of indebtedness).
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is not a public right,' 6 1 a person must meet the constitutional
standard for standing in order to be heard in a bankruptcy
proceeding .162 Where a Chapter 9 plan proposes to increase taxes,
taxpayers clearly have the requisite imminent concrete injury that
can be redressed by the bankruptcy court.163 Even in cases where
the plan does not propose a tax increase, the collective nature of
the proceeding combined with the forward-looking standard of
feasibility points to recognition of taxpayers as parties in
interest. 164
Feasibility has been described as the ceiling on a plan of
adjustment. 165 In other words, feasibility is the most that can be
161 But see C. Scott Pryor, Who Bears the Burden. The Place for
Participation of Municipal Residents in Chapter 9, 37 CAMPBELL L. REV. _
(forthcoming 2014) (arguing that the standing requirements of Article III do not
apply to confirmation of chapter 9 plan because it is a public right).
162 See S. Todd Brown, Non-Pecuniary Interests and the Injudicious Limits
of Appellate Standing in Bankruptcy, 59 BAYLOR L. REv. 569, 578-79 (2007)
(discussing Article III standing, statutory standing, and prudential standing in
bankruptcy).
163 See id. at 585 (implying that anyone whom would suffer an increased
pecuniary burden from a bankruptcy court order should have standing); see also
In re Hutchinson, 5 F.3d 750, 756 (4th Cir.1993) (explaining that "[a]lthough
the Code does not define the term 'party in interest,' the term 'is generally
understood to include all persons whose pecuniary interests are directly affected
by the bankruptcy proceedings").
164 Brown, supra note 162, at 578-79 (footnotes omitted):
An order concerning a discrete proceeding may have a
substantive impact on the bankruptcy case and, directly or as a
result of the order's impact on the case as a whole, the interests
of several distinct parties. Any resulting injury, financial or
not, may constitute an "injury in fact" for Article III purposes
regardless of whether it stems from the outcome of the
proceeding in isolation or due to its impact on the entire
bankruptcy case. Furthermore, these injuries may be redressed
in many instances with affirmative relief authorized under the
Code or by blocking the entry of (or, on appeal, reversal of an
order granting) relief requested by another party. In short, a
large number of parties may satisfy Article
III standing requirements in a single bankruptcy dispute.
165 See 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 943.03[7] (16th ed. 2014) ("[The
remaining section 943(b) statutory requirement] for confirmation of a plan in a
chapter 9 case is that the plan 'is in the best interests of creditors and is feasible'
") (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(7) (2012)).
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extracted from non-creditor stakeholders. 166  Given the
constitutional standing requirements of Article III of the
Constitution and the limits on federal power under the Tenth
Amendment, a workable definition of "party in interest" in
bankruptcy for purposes of feasibility should comprise two
elements. The first distinguishes between parties who are
stakeholders-whose pecuniary interests are at risk-and those
who are simply interested in a municipality's governing actions.
Fears that hospitals might be closed or a generalized concern that
taxes might be increased are within the scope of governmental
powers reserved to the states and their subdivisions by the Tenth
Amendment, 167 and specifically protected by sections 903 and 904
of the Bankruptcy Code. 168  Standing to contest such matters
should thus be limited to higher state authorities and creditors.
Ordinary political means-voting, monitoring, and petitioning-
and not participating in the bankruptcy process are the principal
tools of disgruntled taxpayers and citizens.1
69
On the other hand, the interests of an owner of property whose
tax exempt status would be eliminated by a plan is an example of a
taxpayer whose "pecuniary interests are directly affected" and who
is thus a party in interest. 170  Similarly, extraction of additional
taxes through the plan directly implicates a concrete interest of a
taxpayer. 7 ' A plan of adjustment that provides for tax increases
166 See 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(7) (2012) (while not expressly granting general
taxpayers a vote on the plan, still requiring that the plan be "feasible," even after
a court determines that "the plan is in the best interest of creditors").
167 See Moringiello, supra note 13, at 438 (explaining that the Tenth
Amendment cloaks state municipal mangers with a certain autonomy to decide
matters concerning local government services).
68 11 U.S.C. §§ 903-04 (generally restraining federal judicial intervention
into local matters).
169 See generally Moringiello, supra note 13 at 411-12 (describing the
process of how a plan of adjustment is passed, which lacks any input from
taxpayers, and noting that Chapter 9 leaves much of the municipal oversight to
the political process.
170 In re Hutchinson, 5 F.3d 750, 756 (quoting In re Leavell, 141 B.R. 393,
399 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1992)).
171 See generally McConnell & Picker, supra note 17, at 465-66
(describing municipalities' broad power to tax and explaining that increased
taxes have become the "prime source of payment" to creditors in bankruptcy
proceedings).
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implicates the issue of feasibility and gives taxpayers a sufficient
stake to object on that ground. The bankruptcy court should be
aware of the possibility of widespread tax resistance or an exodus
of taxpayers when considering plan confirmation. Limiting
taxpayer standing in most cases to the issue of feasibility would
reduce the risk of turning the Chapter 9 case into a political free-
for-all. Yet this element will not always be sufficiently
straightforward; most plans of adjustment do not propose to
increase taxes apart from voter approval. 173 There is a continuum
between governance in general and particularized pecuniary
interests17 and an additional element will be necessary to confer
standing on taxpayers in cases where a tax increase is not part of
the plan.
The second element looks to the salience of the stakeholders'
input to the issue at hand. The requirement that a plan be
feasible 175 augurs for a broad construction of party in interest. The
myriad of considerations that go into evaluating a plan's feasibility
suggests that Congress intended an equally expansive
understanding of what counts as a concrete injury for purposes of
standing to be heard. 176 Of all stakeholders, taxpayers should be
172 See Taylor v. Provident Irrigation Dist., 123 F.2d 965, 967 (9th Cir.
1941) ("The burden a district is able to carry is in practice limited by the amount
of the revenues it can raise through the exertion of its taxing power; and this
limit is pretty definitely fixed by the ability of landowners to pay assessments.").
' FRANCISCO VAZQUEZ, EXAMINING CHAPTER 9 MUNICIPAL
BANKRUPTCY CASES 13 (Thomson Reuters/Aspatore 2011).
174 The line between governance and particularized pecuniary interest is
especially blurry in bankruptcy cases, and thus, "standing considerations are
often more complex in bankruptcy cases." Brown, supra note 162; see also id.
("In short, a large number of parties may satisfy Article III standing
requirements in a single bankruptcy dispute.").
175 See infra Part IV.C for a discussion of feasibility.
176 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992)
(Kennedy, J., concurring):
As Government programs and policies become more complex
and far reaching, we must be sensitive to the articulation of
new rights of action that do not have clear analogs in our
common-law tradition. Congress has the power to define
injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to
a case or controversy where none existed before ....
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most concerned that one Chapter 9 filing not be followed by a
subsequent filing by their municipality. 1
77
Taxpayers-along with recipients of municipal services-bear
a disproportionate share of the risk of municipal default.178 Unlike
institutional creditors such as bondholders, the cost of exercising
the exit rights of taxpayers are high.179  Even non-institutional
creditors such as contract parties and employees bear less of a risk
than taxpayers. 180 Only fixed-income retirees may bear more. 18 1
Given the place of real estate taxes in municipal finance and the
relative size of real estate in the portfolio of investments of most
taxpayers, it is more difficult for them to diversify against the risk
of tax increases. 182 Since a greater share of the burden of municipal
insolvency falls on taxpayers more than almost all creditors, 183 the
interests of taxpayers in the feasibility of any plan will usually be
sufficiently concrete to confer standing on the issue of
feasibility. 1
84
177 See Chung, supra note 27, at 1472 & n.62 (citation omitted) (implying
that negative credit ratings of municipalities caused by their defaulting on
obligations impacts every municipality in the state).
178 See Chung, supra note 78, at 807-09 (comparing the limited exposure of
corporate investors to ongoing economic risks suffered in perpetuity by
municipal taxpayers); see also Pryor, supra note 67, at 103 ("When compared
with corporate borrowers and their shareholders, the borrowing decisions and
sources of repayment of municipalities are less flexible and the exit rights of
their taxpaying residents are much more expensive.").
179 Pryor, supra note 67, at 104 ("[Taxpayers] must sell their real property,
an expensive proposition whether it is a home or business location.").
180 Id. at 105 ("Taxpayers... can address the negative effects of risk [only]
by moving from a municipality .... ).
"81 See id. ("[I]t is more difficult for retirees, taxpayers, or employees to
reduce risk.., than it is for bondholders given the need of the former to live in a
particular place and the costs of getting or changing jobs. Such individuals find
it difficult to diversify.").
112 Id. at 104.
183 See McConnell & Picker, supra note 17, at 466 (noting that tax
increases are often used to satisfy creditors).
184 See generally Brown, supra note 162, at 578-79 (discussing bankruptcy
standing, including Article III standing, statutory standing, and prudential
standing).
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Taxpayers in Chapter 9 are analogous to equity security
holders in Chapter 11.185 Taxpayers do not, of course, have a
residual interest in municipal assets.' 86 On the other hand,
taxpayers' long-term losses are not limited to the amount of their
investment; their property is liable in perpetuity for the financial
misfortunes of their municipality.'8 7 A plan that increases taxes is
like a capital call on corporate shareholders, something that is not
required under state or federal bankruptcy law. 188 To the extent
that continued property ownership justifies increased taxes,
taxpayers have a stake comparable to holders of equity interests.
89
Thus, taxpayers, like holders of equity interests, should be counted
as parties in interest for the issue of a plan's feasibility.
90
Although the primary purpose of Chapter 9 "is to permit local
taxing agencies ... and their consenting creditors to compose their
indebtedness,"' 91 stakeholders whose pecuniary interests will be
affected by the plan should have the opportunity to weigh in on a
plan's feasibility. Just as a court cannot deny confirmation simply
185 See Kordana, supra note 17, at 1056 (noting that municipal residents are
the functional equivalent of a corporation's shareholders).
186 See Anderson, supra note 44, at 1368 ("Instead of municipal
government and county government.., the area reverts to unincorporated
county rule alone.").
187 See supra note 178.
188 Kordana, supra note 17, at 1057 ("[A] mandatory tax increase, imposed
on a municipality in bankruptcy, resembles a combination price increase on
customers and capital call on shareholders.").189 Id. at 1057-58 (footnotes omitted):
Thus private law parallels, in which limited liability shifts
losses in bankruptcy from control parties onto parties with
contractual relationships with the bankrupt entity, suggest that
a mandatory tax increase imposed on municipal residents in
favor of bondholders and other investors is neither an
inevitable nor obviously correct default rule. We should not be
surprised if in a Chapter 9 bankruptcy proceeding, losses are
placed on those parties, including bondholders, who have a
contractual relationship with the municipality.
190 The court in the bankruptcy of the City of Detroit appointed its own
expert witness on matters related to feasibility. See Order Appointing Expert
Witness, In re City of Detroit, No. 13-53846 (Bankr. S.D. Mich. Apr. 22, 2014),
ECF No. 4603.
191 Green v. City of Stuart, 135 F.2d 33, 35 (5th Cir. 1943).
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because a plan does not raise taxes,' 92 a court should consider
whether an increased tax burden proposed in a plan will render the
plan unfeasible. Without entertaining objections from taxpayers, a
court may be deprived of a significant source of revenue-related
information that could be crucial to a finding of feasibility.'
93
B. Taxpayer Committees
Recognition of committees of taxpayers would give effect to
Chapter 9's incorporation 94 of section 1102 of the Bankruptcy
Code. 195 The two cases where a taxpayer has successfully objected
to confirmation of a plan demonstrate that it will be an exceptional
situation where a single taxpayer can expect a return
commensurate with the cost of the battle. 196 In no sizeable Chapter
9 case will a single taxpayer do the work necessary to demonstrate
that a plan is not feasible. 197 A committee of taxpayers, however,
192 See In re Corcoran Hosp. Dist., 233 B.R. 449, 459 (Bankr. E.D. Cal.
1999) (holding that hospital district was not obliged even to attempt to
raise taxes to pay its unsecured creditors in full because evidence indicated it
would be a "futile exercise").
193 See e.g., Taylor v. Provident Irrigation Dist., 123 F.2d 965, 967 (9th
Cir. 1941) (ruling that the properties within the district could not sustain a much
higher tax burden, based on "informed... witnesses who took into
consideration all relevant factors-the past experience of the district over a long
period of years, its assessment history the nature of the crops which the lands
are capable of producing, soil conditions, prices and production costs [for
taxpaying farmers]") (emphasis added).
194 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (2012).
195 Section 1102(a)(1) mandates appointment of a creditors' committee. id.
§ 1102(a)(1). Appointment of a committee of equity security holders is within
the discretion of the United States trustee. Id. Even if the United States trustee
declines to appoint one, the court may order the appointment of a committee of
equity securities holders on the request of a party in interest. Id. § 1 102(a)(2).
196 See In re Mount Carbon Metro. Dist., No. 97-20215 MSK, 1999 WL
34995477, at *3 (Bankr. D. Colo. July 20, 1999); In re Wolf Creek Valley
Metro. Dist., 138 B.R. 610, 613, 616, 620 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1992).
197 See In re Addison Cmty. Hosp. Auth., 175 B.R. 646, 648 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. 1994) (showing that taxpayers sought to object to the hospital's Chapter 9
plan because they believed it was inconsistent with state law, not because the
plan was not feasible). Even a self-described group of interested citizens
objected to the relocation of a hospital on the ground that it was ineligible for
Chapter 9 relief, but did not contest the feasibility of the plan. In re Bamwell
Cnty. Hosp., 459 B.R. 903, 906 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2011).
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whose fees and expenses will be borne by the estate, will be able to
rebut a one-sided feasibility analysis presented by a municipality
and supporting creditors. Yet, the list of committees to which
section 1102 refers does not explicitly include taxpayers. 198 Does
silence preclude appointment of such a committee?
Neither Chapter X, XI, nor XII authorized the court to
appoint an official committee of equity security holders. 199 The
Bankruptcy Code of 1978 included-for the first time-a
provision for the appointment by the court of such a committee. °0
Congress had concluded that equity committees were appropriate
to "counteract the natural tendency of a debtor in distress to pacify
large creditors, with whom the debtor would expect to do business,
at the expense of small and scattered public investors., 20 1  The
risks to the interests of taxpayers in a municipal bankruptcy are
greater than those of shareholders in a business corporation. The
inability of creditors in a Chapter 9 case to convert it to one under
Chapter 7 makes it all the more likely that they might be pacified
at the expense of unrepresented taxpayers. Most taxpayers, like
most investors in public corporations, are small and isolated and
thus in danger from the machinations of large and sophisticated
institutional stakeholders.
Appointment of an equity committee in a Chapter 11 case is
not mandatory.20 2 There is no reason to incur the expenses of a
committee when a corporation is hopelessly insolvent and neither
liquidation nor reorganization will lead to any recovery for equity
203interests. Nonetheless, insolvency is not the sole criterion for the
98 11 U.S.C. §§ 1 102(a)(1)-(2).
199 See generally 2A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 44.21[1]-[5] (14th ed.
1987) (discussing the appointment of committees by creditors).
200 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2).
201 S. Rep. No. 95-989, at 10 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
5796.
202 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1).
203 See In re Wang Labs., 149 B.R. 1, 3-4 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1992) (citation
omitted) (finding that "[w]hen a debtor appears to be hopelessly insolvent [an
equity committee is not generally warranted] because neither the debtor nor the
creditors should have to bear the expense of negotiating over the terms of what
is in essence a gift").
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appointment of an equity committee. 20 4 Indeed, recent bankruptcy
cases have downplayed insolvency in favor of an inquiry into a
variety of factors including whether "there is a substantial
likelihood that [equity] will receive a meaningful distribution .,,205
In any event, taxpayers remain stakeholders in a city regardless of
the extent of its insolvency.20 6 Though not receiving a distribution
in the typical form of property, taxpayers will continue to receive a
variety of municipal services. 20 7 Other factors that courts consider
when deciding whether to appoint an equity committee, such as
numerosity, lack of effective representation by other parties in
interest, and need for representation in the case, also suggest that a
taxpayers committee will be appropriate in large municipal
208bankruptcies.
The absence of "taxpayer" from section 1102(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code should not limit the power of the court to appoint
a taxpayers committee. 2 9 The incorporation of the entirety of
section 1102 into Chapter 9,210 recognition of taxpayers as parties
in interest,211 and the general powers of the court under section
212 211105212 cumulatively warrant such action.
204 In re Williams Commc'n Gr., Inc., 281 B.R. 216, 220 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2002) ("[T]he court retains the discretion to appoint an equity committee based
on the facts of each case.").
205 Id. at 223.
206 See supra text accompanying notes 71-75.
207 See Anderson, supra note 38, at 1196 ("Indeed, the ongoing provision
of basic services is an absolute necessity in retaining residents and businesses
who generate any kind of tax and fee revenue.").
208 The appointment of an expert witness on the issue of feasibility in the
bankruptcy of Detroit is consistent with the need for a taxpayers committee. See
Order Appointing Expert Witness, supra note 190.
209 See 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1)-(2) (2012) (omitting taxpayers from the list
of committees); see generally Matthew Bruckner, The Virtue in Bankruptcy, 45
Loy. U. CHI. L. J. 233, 236 (2013) (stating that the Bankruptcy Code not only
"empowers bankruptcy judges to confirm a plan of reorganization, provided that
the plan is feasible[,]" but it also "empowers the bankruptcy courts to use their
discretion to determine the relevant considerations in a particular case and then
to apply those factors to the facts of that case").
210 11 U.S.C. § 901.
211 In re Mount Carbon Metro. Dist., No. 97-20215 MSK, 1999 WL
34995477, at *3 (Bankr. D. Colo. July 20, 1999); In re Addison Cmty. Hosp.
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C. Strict Feasibility
Notwithstanding the affirmative vote of each class, section
1 129(a)(1 1) of the Bankruptcy Code requires that the bankruptcy
court find that the plan is "not likely to be followed by liquidation,
or the need for further financial reorganization;" in short, the plan
must be feasible.214 Even if no party objects to confirmation, the
court must find that the plan is feasible before confirming it.215 In
other words, the bankruptcy court is entitled to substitute its
judgment for that of the debtor and its creditors.216 Yet nowhere
does Chapter 11 define feasibility nor does the Bankruptcy Code
list the elements a court should consider when evaluating a plan's
feasibility.217 Bankruptcy courts have gone on to consider a range
of factors in connection with feasibility,2 1 8 but there is no
Auth., 175 BR. 646, 647 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1994); In re Wolf Creek Valley
Metro. Dist., 138 B.R. 610, 613,616, 620 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1992).
212 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) ("The court may issue any order.., that is necessary
or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.").
213 Unlike a surcharge on exempt property for which the Supreme Court
found no warrant under section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, Law v. Siegel,
No. 12-5196, 571 U.S. _ (Mar. 4, 2014), appointment of a taxpayers
committee is within the scope of the equitable powers of the bankruptcy court
and does not conflict with any provision of the Bankruptcy Code.
214 11 U.S.C. § 1 129(a)(1 1).
215 See, e.g., In re M&S Assocs., 138 B.R. 845, 848 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
1992) ("The bankruptcy court has an affirmative obligation to scrutinize a
reorganization plan to determine whether it is feasible. In order to confirm a
plan, the court must make a specific finding that the plan, as proposed, is
feasible.").
216 See id ("The bankruptcy court must be satisfied that a reorganization
plan satisfies all of the requirements of section 1129(a) ... in order to confirm
the plan.").
217 See Bruckner, supra note 209, at 236 ("[T]he Bankruptcy Code
empowers bankruptcy judges to confirm a plan of reorganization, provided that
the plan is feasible. However, the Code does not define feasibility, nor does it
provide any substantive guidance as to how feasibility should be determined.").
218 See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1129.02[11] (16th ed. 2014) listing
six factors:
(1) the adequacy of the debtor's capital structure;
(2) the earning power of its business;
(3) economic conditions;
(4) the ability of the debtor's management;
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comprehensive list, and even less is there a consensus of how the
factors should be weighed.21 9
What is merely unclear in Chapter 11 is an impenetrable fog in
Chapter 9. Section 1129(a)(1 1) of the Bankruptcy Code is not
incorporated into Chapter 9.220 Instead, section 943(b)(7) simply
makes an undefined "feasibility" a requirement of confirmation of
221a plan of adjustment. On its face, "this standard includes, and
then goes beyond, the Chapter 11 expectation that the debtor will
not need another bankruptcy reorganization in the near future.
' 222
Like cases under Chapter 11,223 however, most bankruptcy courts
have paid little more than lip service to the requirement of
feasibility in an uncontested Chapter 9 filing.224 The relatively few
(5) the probability of the continuation of the same
management; and
(6) any other related matters which determine the prospects of
a sufficiently successful operation to enable performance of
the provisions of the plan.
219 See Stephen H. Case, Some Confirmed Chapter 11 Plans Fail. So
What?, 47 B.C. L. REv. 59, 60 (2005) (footnotes omitted):
A frequently cited legal standard for feasibility is whether the
factual showing at the plan confirmation hearing establishes a
"reasonable assurance of success," though "[s]ucess need not
be guaranteed." In the context of section 1129(a)(11),
relatively few reported cases articulate much more than this
basic standard, except to state that Chapter 11 issues are fact-
intensive and that trial court decisions will be upheld unless
"clearly erroneous."
220 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (2012).
221 Id. § 943(b)(7) ("The court shall confirm the plan if... the plan is in the
best interests of creditors and is feasible.").
222 Anderson, supra note 38, at 1193.
223 See Case, supra note 219, at 67:
In the author's experience, uncontested Chapter 11 plan
confirmation hearings have often been the result of successful
consensus-gathering efforts. These efforts frequently result in
hearings where the court has no reason to question plan-
proponent representations with respect to feasibility. This can
result in court acceptance of expectations as to future revenue
levels, interest rates, and business activity that might not have
been able to withstand an attack from well-prepared creditors
opposing the plan.
224 See, e.g., In re Corcoran Hosp. Dist., 233 B.R. 449, 453 (Bankr. E.D.
Cal. 1999); In re City of Colo. Springs Spring Creek Gen. Impr. Dist., 187 B.R.
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contested Chapter 9 cases make it difficult to identify any uniquely
municipal definition of plan feasibility or even to list factors a
court should consider.225
Regardless of the lack of statutory guidance, bankruptcy
courts should apply a significant level of scrutiny to the feasibility
of a municipality's plan, especially where taxpayers object to its
confirmation. Without the right to vote, an attack on a plan's
feasibility is the only recourse taxpayers have.226 The pre-
Bankruptcy Code history of Chapter 9 suggests that Congress
understood that feasibility was particularly important in municipal
bankruptcy because the alternative of liquidation is not
available.227
In order to confirm a plan under former Chapter IX the
bankruptcy court was required to find that the plan was "for the
best interests of creditors" and that it was "fair and equitable."
228
The Supreme Court of the United States in Kelley v. Everglades
Drainage District2 9 read a subsidiary finding of feasibility into the
requirement that a plan be fair and equitable. 23" In Kelley, a
683, 686 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1995) (concluding that feasibility was met, but
without further explanation).
225 See, e.g., In re Mount Carbon Metro. Dist., 242 B.R. 18, 35 (Bankr. D.
Colo. 1999) ("A plan should offer a reasonable prospect of success and be
workable. In Chapter 9, this requires a practical analysis of whether the debtor
can accomplish what the plan proposes and provide governmental services.").
226 See supra text and accompanying notes 7, 26.
227 See, e.g., The Bankruptcy Reform Act Revision of the Salary Fixing
Procedure for Bankruptcy Judges Adjustment of Debts of Political Subdivisions
and Public Agencies and Instrumentalities: Hearings Before the S. Subcomm. on
Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong.
213 (1975) [hereinafter 1975 Subcommittee Hearings] (statement of Antonin
Scalia, Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, DOJ) (explaining to the
Senate Subcommittee that the idea of "feasibility" is necessary "to make it very
clear to the judge that he has a serious obligation under the statute to look
closely into the future financial plans of the city").
228 See 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 81.19 (14th ed. 1978) ("[The
bankruptcy judge] should enter the interlocutory decree if, and only if, he is
satisfied that the [Chapter IX] plan (1) is fair, equitable, and for the best interest
of creditors and does not discriminate unfairly in favor of any creditor or class of
creditors. ...").
229 Kelley v. Everglades Drainage Dist., 319 U.S. 415 (1943).
210 Id. at 419-20.
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dissenting creditor objected to a plan that had the overwhelming
support of the class of which he was a member.2 3' The bankruptcy
court overruled the objection, confirmed the plan, and the creditor
appealed.232 The Supreme Court of the United States reversed on
the ground that the proponent of the plan had not submitted
evidence sufficient to "permit a reasonable, and hence an informed,
estimate of the probable future revenues available for the
satisfaction of creditors." 233 Elaborating on what needed to be
shown, the Court observed that a wide variety of tax-related issues
should be considered:
[T]he revenues which have in the past been received from
each source of taxation, the present assessed value of
property subject to each tax, the tax rates currently
prescribed, the probable effect on future revenues of a
revision in the tax structure. . ., the extent of past tax
delinquencies, and any general economic conditions of
the District which may reasonably be expected to affect
the percentage of future delinquencies. 4
The Court's emphasis on taxes, and hence taxpayers, is
unmistakable. The Court in Kelley did not explain why such
evidence of feasibility was necessary but clearly it presupposed
that special consideration of the ability of the municipality to
generate the revenue necessary to fund a plan was vital to
confirmation. Creditor approval is not enough when plan funding
depends on squeezing more money out of taxpayers. Unlike
reorganizing corporations that can project new and additional
sources of income, the primary source of revenue over which
municipalities have control are real estate tax collections.235
231 Id. at 419 ("[T]he fact that the vast majority of security holders may
have approved a plan is not the test of whether that plan satisfies the statutory
standard.") (citation omitted).
... Id. at 417.23 31 Id. at 420.
214 Id. at 421.
235 Twenty-five percent of the revenue of municipal governments comes
from state and federal governments. Hajnal & Trounstine, supra note 34, at
1136 ("Because a quarter of local government revenues are provided by state
20151
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Focusing on the details of tax revenue generation effectively places
the interests of taxpayers in the forefront of confirmation of a plan
of adjustment.236
Feasibility was also at the center of discussion when Congress
revised Chapter IX in 1976.237 By then the Kelly decision was
understood to require a municipality to project a balanced budget
within a reasonable period of time and to tether the condition of
feasibility to the "fair and equitable" requirement of Chapter IX
238
With the 1976 revisions, feasibility became an independent
requirement and was no longer merely an implication of fair and
equitable. 239 The requirement of feasibility continued virtually
unchanged with the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code two years
later.24°
Concerns about feasibility have led to denial of confirmation
only in few cases since the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code.24'
The bankruptcy court in Mount Carbon Metropolitan Distric?
42
and federal governments and because much of this federal and state funding is
earmarked toward specific functions, local governments may have little power
to control the direction of their own spending."); see also Chung, supra note 78,
at 791-92 (distinguishing the drastically limited sources of revenue and options
for municipalities as opposed to for-profit corporations' broad array of available
financial tools).
236 See Fano v. Newport Heights Irrigation Dist., 114 F.2d 563, 565-66 (9th
Cir. 1940) (finding creditor successfully obtained reversal of confirmation of
plan of adjustment that reduced principal obligation to bondholders where
solvent district held assets worth multiples of bond debt and had experienced
low rate of tax delinquencies). One wonders if the outcome would have been
different had taxpayers been parties.
237 See 1975 Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 227, at 212-13
(highlighting a lengthy debate about the feasibility requirement in municipal
bankruptcies).
238 In re Mount Carbon Metro. Dist., 242 B.R. 18, 33 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1999).
239 See 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 943.LH[2] (16th ed. 2014) ("[T]he
inclusion of the feasibility test in the 1976 Act was not intended as a substantive
change, since the House considered that feasibility was an element of the fair
and equitable rule in Chapter IX cases under the 1937 Act.").
240 S. REP. No. 95-989, at 8-9 (1978); H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 262 (1977);
124 CONG. REC. Hll,100 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of Rep.
Edwards).
241 In re Mount Carbon Metro. Dist., 242 B.R. at 18.
242 Id.
116 [Vol. 24
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was one of those cases, and it analyzed feasibility in an instructive
way.243 Mount Carbon was a largely undeveloped Colorado
244metropolitan district near Denver. Three real estate developers
owned a majority of the land within the district.245 The district
owed a note and bondholders approximately $58 million and
lacked funds sufficient to develop the infrastructure necessary to
permit development of its land.246 Without infrastructure and
development, the district would not have been able to generate tax
revenue sufficient to retire its debt.247 The majority of the debt,
however, was owed to one of the developers who agreed to pay the
Chapter 9 expenses of the district.
248
Mount Carbon's plan of adjustment proposed to issue new
bonds to pay its pre-bankruptcy debt, and projected that it could
pay the new bonds by nearly doubling its current tax rate and
selling rights to its water allocation.249 Increasing the tax rate and
selling water rights could raise sufficient funds, however, only if
there was "immediate, sustained and complete development" of the
land within the district.250 The bankruptcy court ignored the
overwhelming creditor support for the plan because, unlike
Chapter 11 reorganization, creditors can neither oust municipal
government, nor propose a plan, nor force liquidation.25' Thus,
according to the court, "creditors may accept even a hopelessly
infeasible Chapter 9 plan in preference to the non-bankruptcy
status quo. 252 Such bias in favor of virtually any plan increases
the risk a plan will afford insufficient regard for taxpayers who
cannot vote on its confirmation.
3
The court then conducted a thorough analysis of the feasibility
of Mount Carbon's "on the come" funding projections and
243 See id at 32-33 (showing differences in Chapter 9 and Chapter 11
feasibility standards).
24 4 Id. at 23.
245 Id.
246 Id. at 24.
247 Id. at 27.
248 In re Mount Carbon Metro. Dist., 242 B.R. at 24, 25.
249 Id. at 26-27.
250 Id. at 27.
251 Id. at 34.
252 Id.
253 id.
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concluded they left "no room for error. ' '254 The court went on to
observe that feasibility is not merely a legal standard that is
satisfied by the power of the municipality to issue replacement
bonds.2 55 Feasibility requires that a municipality be able to pay its
restructured indebtedness.256 Without the extensive input of
taxpayers, the court in Mount Carbon would not have known that
the district's projections were incomplete and unsupported by "any
evidence that landowners are able and willing to pay." '257 Only a
presumption that taxpayers are parties in interest can ensure
bankruptcy courts have a sufficient record to determine whether a
plan is feasible, and in larger cases, only a taxpayers committee
will have the resources to develop such a record.2 58 Thus only
when courts are concerned about feasibility will the interest of
taxpayers be protected.
V. CONCLUSION
Courts should afford a presumption that taxpayers are parties
in interest on the issue of the feasibility of a municipal plan of
adjustment. Taxpayers may be parties in interest on other matters
but should be afforded a rebuttable presumption of standing with
respect to feasibility. The presumption of taxpayer standing may
be rebutted for plans that do not propose tax increases. Even in no-
tax-increase plans, taxpayer input may be appropriate because
taxpayers can have particular insight into managerial slack and on
those aspects of a plan that would reduce municipal services.259
The United States trustee should form a committee of
taxpayers in sizeable Chapter 9 cases. An individual taxpayer's
return on the investment of contesting feasibility will almost
always be inadequate to justify the cost.260  Without a party
254 In re Mount Carbon Metro. Dist., 242 B.R. at 27, 37-38.
255 Id. at 36 ("A feasibility determination based simply upon whether the
District can issue Exchange Bonds, as compared to whether it can pay them,
would be so superficial as to be meaningless.").256 Id. at 33.
257 Id. at 37.
258 See supra discussion Part IV(B), 1.
259 See supra text accompanying notes 44-45, 114.
260 See supra text accompanying note 196.
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adverse to a consensual plan, a bankruptcy court runs the risk of
confirming one that will ultimately fail.261 An estate-financed
taxpayers committee will help insure a proper record for the
confirmation decision.
Assessment of feasibility is especially important in Chapter 9.
The business judgment of the voting constituencies of a Chapter 11
debtor's creditors in a corporate reorganization is likely to be
adequate to inform the court's judgment on feasibility.2 62 The
absence of the alternative of liquidation, and the inability of
taxpayers to vote on confirmation, makes it vital that the court give
significant attention to the issue of feasibility in Chapter 9. Only
the input of taxpayers can insure the court's attention is well
informed.
261 See supra text accompanying note 191.
262 See supra notes 97-111 and accompanying text (discussing the
corporate controls and comprehensive data reporting enjoyed by the private
sector, compared to the lack thereof in municipal financing).
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